Abstract: The honesty of people in an online panel from 15 countries was measured in two experiments: reporting a coin flip with a reward for "heads", and an online quiz with the possibility of cheating. There are large differences in honesty across countries. Average honesty is positively correlated with per capita GDP. This is driven mostly by GDP differences arising before 1950, rather than by GDP growth since 1950. A country's average honesty correlates with the proportion of its population that is Protestant. These facts suggest a long-run relationship between honesty and economic development. The experiment also elicited participants' expectations about different countries' levels of honesty. Expectations were not correlated with reality. Instead they appear to be driven by cognitive biases, including self-projection.
• Average honesty of resident nationals of 15 countries was measured in two experiments
• There are large cross-country differences in honesty
• Honesty correlates at country level with GDP and Protestantism
• Participants' expectations about honesty in different countries were also elicited
• Expectations were not correlated to reality, but driven by cognitive biases 1 this could be detected. This dual design lets me check that results are robust to using different honesty measures.
This is important, because differences between countries may reflect reactions to one specific experimental paradigm: I discuss a possible example below. I also use an online sample, rather than drawing from university subject pools like much previous research. Though it is still not a true random sample, this sample is more diverse and closer to the population on some demographic variables.
With data from the experiments, I first test Feng's basic intuition that levels of honesty differ between societies. Then, taking country average levels of honesty, I relate them to economic development at different times in history. I also test whether honesty is related to religion, a cultural variable that is often believed to affect economic outcomes, and to a measure of country-level corruption. Contrary to some previous research, I find large differences in honesty between countries. Inter-country differences relate to economic growth before 1950, but are unrelated to growth since then. This seems to support the argument above, that the relationship between honesty and economic growth exists over the historical long run.
The ability to realize gains from trade and cooperation may depend not just on partners' honesty, but also on their mutual trust. People hold beliefs about the honesty of both their fellow citizens, and those in other countries. Under rational expectations, these beliefs would be correct on average. However, a large literature in psychology examines stereotypical beliefs about groups (McGarty, Yzerbyt and Spears, 2002) . Stereotypes may, but need not, be accurate (Jussim et al., 2009) . Different groups' beliefs about each other can affect 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 how they interact. For instance, the German public's willingness to support debt bailouts may be affected by stereotypes about Southern Europeans (Soll, 2015) . So it is important to understand how these beliefs are formed. Participants in the experiment were asked to predict the average honesty of other participants from different countries. The data support neither rational expectations, nor the alternative hypothesis that people predict others' honesty from their experience in their own country. Instead, these beliefs are driven by biases, including self-projection and, surprisingly, pessimism about the honesty of people in one's own country.
A growing literature in economics uses incentivized experiments to study honesty. Initial experiments examined whether people's unwillingness to lie was related to costs (Gneezy, 2005; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Vanberg, 2008) . More recent work has revealed variety in the motivations of liars: people may lie to benefit others (Erat and Gneezy, 2012) or in such a way as to make their lie less obvious (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013) . There is also some evidence for heterogeneity: women are less willing to tell a lie (Dreber and Johannesson, 2008) . Abeler, Becker and Falk (2014) run the coinflip paradigm within a telephone survey of a representative sample of Germans, and find that complete honesty cannot be ruled out.
Within a broader literature comparing social preferences across cultures (e.g. Croson and Buchan 1999; Henrich 2004; Henrich et al. 2006; Herrmann, Thöni and Gächter 2008) , some existing papers have compared honesty across countries. Holm and Kawagoe (2010) run a sender-receiver game in Sweden and Japan, finding no differences in average levels of truth-telling. Pascual-Ezama et al. (2015) report an experiment among university students in 16 countries. Subjects were asked to flip a coin and report the result; reporting heads was rewarded with a chocolate. Cross-country differences in honesty are small and insignificant. Mann et al. (2015) run a "dice rolling" game, similar to the coin flip, in five countries. They find small, marginally significant differences in honesty. Both these studies offered relatively low incentives (a chocolate, and 20 cents average per lie, respectively), which may explain the low levels of dishonesty and small differences they report. Dieckmann et al. (2015) run a "coin flip" game in five European countries and find significant differences in honesty between countries. They also examine subjects' incentivized assessments of different nations' honesty, with results similar to those reported here. In a recent paper, Gächter and Schulz (2016) also find inter-country differences.
There are two key differences between their paper and this one: first, they use student subject pools, while I use people from online market research panels; second, I test honesty using two different paradigms, whilst they use a dice rolling paradigm only. Both choices are discussed further below.
This paper also speaks to the literature on cross-country differences in trust and social capital. Most crosscountry comparative research on trust uses survey data (Porta et al., 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1997) . A potentially important proximate cause of trust is trustworthiness, including honesty. More than questions on trust, survey questions on trustworthiness face the problem that respondents may not always answer truthfully. Behavioural data can therefore play an important role in measurement, and indeed several papers have used the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995) to measure trust and trustworthiness across cultures (Yamagishi, 1988; Buchan, Croson and Dawes, 2002; Holm and Danielson, 2005; Bornhorst et al., 2010) . The paradigms used here have the advantage over the trust game that they require no interactions between participants, making them simpler to administer. A subtler difference is in what the experiments measure. Responder behaviour in the trust game may be affected by several factors, including altruism towards one's partner, reciprocity and a perceived social norm. In the experiments here, respondents face a simpler choice between honesty and material self-interest. Below, I examine the relationship of honesty with questionnaire and behavioural measures of trust, and find no evidence that they are related at country level. This paper's contribution, then, is to estimate the honesty of a demographically diverse sample in a large set of countries, using two different incentivized experiments; to relate the country-level results to economic development and cultural background; and to look at expectations about people's honesty in different countries.
Design
The experiment was implemented in Qualtrics, an online survey platform. Participants were recruited from 15 countries, in two waves. The first wave consisted of 804 respondents from Brazil, China, Greece, Japan, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. The second wave added 735 respondents from Argentina, Denmark, Great Britain, India, Portugal, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey. 3 The countries were chosen to provide a mix of regions, levels of development, and levels of social trust. Initial analysis of the first wave of countries showed significant cross-country differences. The second wave was added so as to learn more about the correlates of honesty at country level. For simplicity, the analysis combines data from both waves.
Participants were members of managed online panels. These are typically used by firms for market research.
Members are recruited from across the web. They sign up to receive regular invitations to surveys and questionnaires. Recruitment materials usually emphasize both material benefits of taking part ("share your opinion to win gifts, cash and test products") and non-material benefits ("have your say"). Sample frames for individual surveys are then selected and a randomized sample of candidates is invited to participate by email. Sometimes extra participants are recruited directly from the web. To get a particular demographic profile, quota sampling is used: individuals are invited until enough people from a given category (e.g. a particular gender and age group) 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 have completed the survey. So, these panels are not probability samples of the country populations: quota sampling provides balance across gender and age, but respondents could be unrepresentative in other dimensions.
For example, all Swiss respondents answered in French, although German was available as a questionnaire language.
How does online sampling compare with the widely-used method of recruiting participants from university lab subject pools? Both methods typically involve a subset of the population (students; internet users), from which participants are recruited to a database and subsequently receive invitations to participate in experiments. in Denmark (internetlivestats.com). Quota sampling guarantees a reasonable spread of age groups, and other demographics (e.g. education) are likely to be closer to the country population than student samples. In short, student samples may be better at capturing the moral standards of a country's elite, while online panels may better reflect those of ordinary people.
Another difference with a standard laboratory experiment is that no experimenter is present. This reduces control: for example, subjects may have answered in the presence of others. Conversely, it may also reduce experimenter demand and social desirability effects.
The experiment contained two different measures of honesty. In the coin flip, respondents were asked to get a coin ready and had to confirm they had done this. On the next screen, they were asked to flip the coin and report the result. They were told that they would get extra money (either $3 or $5) if they reported "heads". So, respondents who flipped "tails" faced a choice between telling the truth and getting paid. This paradigm allows us to estimate aggregate honesty, from the difference between the proportion reporting heads, and the 50% proportion expected if everyone tells the truth. It has been used in several previous experiments (e.g. Bucciol and Piovesan 2011; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013; Abeler, Becker and Falk 2014; Pascual-Ezama et al. 2015 ).
In the quiz, subjects were given a test on the topic of music, consisting of six open-ended questions. They were asked not to look up the answers on the internet, and they had to tick a box confirming they had answered on their own before moving on. Since the survey was web-based, and respondents were not monitored, they could always actually look up the answers online. Participants were offered a money incentive ($3 or $5) if they answered all the questions correctly. So, they faced a temptation: they could cheat by looking the answers up, and lie by ticking the checkbox to affirm they had not done so. The questions were: 6. Name the town and state of the US where Michael Jackson was born.
The topic of music was chosen so as to minimize the test's cultural bias: Lady Gaga and Michael Jackson have global name recognition, and classical music is also known in non-Western societies. Questions 2, 4 and 6 were designed to be very easy to look up online: they can be answered, in any of the quiz countries and languages, by typing "Lady Gaga", "Debussy" or "Michael Jackson" into Google. 4 They were also designed to be very difficult for almost anyone to answer without cheating, and I check this below.
The order of the coin flip and quiz experiments was randomized. After completing both experiments, subjects answered a 15 question integrity questionnaire taken from Whiteley (2012). This asks participants to rate whether 15 actions are "always", "sometimes", "rarely" or "never" justified. Typical actions include "making up things on a job application" and "driving faster than the speed limit". Next, subjects were told that some people from one specific country out of the countries in their wave had also taken the coin flip question. They were asked to guess what percentage of people from that country answered "heads". Someone who believed that people in the country were all honest (all dishonest) would guess 50% (100%). Half of the respondents were offered $2 extra if their answer was within 10 percentage points of the true figure (treatment INCENTIVE).
The experiment finished with a brief questionnaire on demographics. Wave 2 included additional demographic questions, as well as four questions on self-reported unethical behaviour. Survey materials were professionally translated into the countries' major languages.
The sample within each nation had equal numbers of men and women, and equal numbers of five age groups (18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55+) . Payments were made to respondents by Qualtrics in addition to its standard payment to respondents and by the same mechanism: rewards are translated into points which can be spent on various items including vouchers, gift cards, tickets for cash lotteries and so on. This payment mechanism, as well as purchasing power differences, makes it hard to equalize the value of incentives across countries. However, several papers suggest that lying does not respond to incentive size (see above). To check 4 Google is not widely used in China, but other search engines give equally easy access to these answers. whether incentive sizes would affect my results, I randomized the size of payments offered. Half the subjects were assigned to the HIGH payment treatment. They were offered $5 for reporting heads in the coin flip and $5 for getting all quiz questions right. The remaining subjects were assigned to the LOW payment treatment, where both payments were $3. This difference between payments is about the same as differences in purchasing power between sample countries. 5 If the HIGH/LOW treatments did not affect behaviour, this should make us less worried that differences between countries come from different ieffective incentive sizes. The HIGH/LOW and INCENTIVE treatments, and the order of the two honesty experiments, were balanced within countries.
Results
Descriptive statistics are shown in the appendix. Only country residents who stated that they were of the country's nationality are included in the analysis (e.g. residents of Turkey who gave their nationality as Turkish), so numbers of respondents vary between countries. 6
The paper contains multiple tests, with two separate dependent variables. I report unadjusted p values, but in some places I mention p values adjusted for multiple testing within a specific group of tests, using the method of Holm (1979) . This adjustment can be used when p values are not independent, and is conservative: an adjusted p value gives an upper bound for the probability, under the null hypothesis, that at least one test in the group gives a false positive result. All analyses use unweighted samples: weighting age/gender groups, to reflect the size of these groups within each country's population, gives essentially unchanged results.
Result 1 Individuals' dishonesty in the coin flip, dishonesty in the quiz, and self-reported unethical actions in the past year, were positively related. However, stated ethical attitudes were not related to dishonesty in the experiments.
We want to be sure that different experimental paradigms capture the same underlying dimension of behaviour.
There are two experimental measures of honesty: respondents' reports on the coin flip, and their scores out of 3 on the hard quiz questions, numbers 2, 4 and 6 (henceforth simply "quiz score"). Median quiz scores were 2 for those reporting heads on the coin flip, and 0 for those reporting tails (Mann-Whitney p <0.001). Put another way, proportions reporting heads were 62% for those scoring 0 on the quiz, 65% for those scoring 1, 68% for those scoring 2, and 77% for those scoring 3. If the proportion reporting heads in a group is h, the group' s 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 estimated level of dishonest reporting is 2h 1, so coin flip dishonesty about doubled between the lowest and the highest quiz scorers, from 24% to 54%.
Subjects in wave 2 were asked whether they had taken four unethical actions within the past twelve months:
avoiding a fare on public transport; calling in sick when not actually unwell; making something up on a job application; and downloading music or videos without paying for them. 554 out of 665 subjects reported only zero or one unethical actions. Those who reported heads in the coin flip admitted to significantly more unethical actions (mean 0.79 versus 0.61, Mann-Whitney test p = 0.039). Number of actions reported also correlated with higher quiz scores (Spearman's r= 0.09; p = 0.02). This measure is not perfect, as it may capture variation in willingness to admit these actions. Still, these results provide evidence that both experiments tap the same dimension of behaviour, and have some external validity. 7
By contrast, there is no evidence of a link between people's expressed moral attitudes and their behaviour.
Answers in the integrity questionnaire ranged from 1 (an action is "always justified") to 4 ("never justified"). 8 Following Whiteley (2012), I created a moral integrity score by summing answers to all 15 questions. Mean integrity scores for those reporting heads and tails were 50.9 and 51.6 respectively. This is marginally significant in one specification (t test p = 0.054; Mann-Whitney p = 0.49), but the difference is small. The correlation with quiz scores was small and insignificant (Spearman's r = 0.008; p = 0.8).
Result 2 There was significant evidence for dishonesty in all countries.
The first graph in Figure 1 shows the proportion reporting heads by country. The right hand scale shows estimated levels of lying. In every country except Great Britain and South Africa, we can reject the hypothesis that the proportion reporting heads is 50% at the 0.05 significance level in a binomial test.
The second graph shows mean quiz scores by country. The association between quiz scores and the coin flip makes it plausible that both measures are capturing individuals' levels of dishonesty. Nevertheless, perhaps some subjects could answer the hard questions without cheating. To check this, the quiz was administered to 144 students in a laboratory, where cheating was difficult. 9 Of the hard questions, while 25 out of 144 students got question 2 right, only two students got question 4 right, and only the same two students got question 6 right.
Thus, a score above one on hard questions was extremely hard to achieve without cheating. 10 In each country, 7 Other research has found that the coin flip and similar experiments predict real world dishonest behaviour (Galeotti, Dai and Villeval, 2016; Cohn and Maréchal, 2015) .
8 "Straightliners" who gave the same answer for every question were removed from this analysis. 9 Participants in the laboratory were from 37 countries. The most common were Romania and the United Kingdom. Subjects earned a £3 reward for getting all six questions right.
10 Per-country mean quiz scores on "hard" questions were correlated as follows with four alternative measures: mean quiz scores on all questions 0.955; proportions getting all six questions right 0.609; proportions getting more than one hard question right 0.983;, and scores on questions 4 and 6 only 0.984. The key results are unchanged using these alternatives (calculations available on request). 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 more than 30% of subjects scored above one; even if 10% of the population could do this without cheating, much more than in the laboratory sample, the hypothesis of no cheating would be rejected in every country at p < 0.001 . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 Result 3 Levels of honesty varied significantly across countries.
A chi-squared test of proportion reporting heads against nationality rejects equality of proportions (p <0.001).
A Kruskal-Wallis test of quiz scores against nationality rejects equality of medians (p <0.001). Thus, both measures of dishonesty vary among nations. 11 Overall differences are large: the level of estimated misreporting in the coin flip varies from 3.4% in Great Britain to 70% in China. But note that standard errors are also large.
The sample was designed to test for differences between countries, not to provide tight estimates for any one population, so not too much weight should be placed on any individual country's score.
One concern may be that these results just reflect anti-Western bias -non-Western subjects may care less about lying to Western researchers. Surveys were translated and carried no branding, but participants were told that data from their answers would be stored at the University of Essex, so they could conceivably have drawn inferences from this. A crude check is to correlate country average behaviour with distance from the UK. For per cent reporting heads in the coin flip, the correlation is high (0.507) and just misses 5% significance (p = 0.054);
for quiz scores, the correlation is essentially zero (0.002, p = 0.99). It is hard to explain why anti-Western bias would only have affected behaviour in the coin flip.
To confirm the inter-country differences, I run regressions with controls. Tables 7 and 8 in the appendix show linear regressions of nationality dummies (with omitted category the UK) on the probability of reporting heads and on quiz score. The second column in each table includes as controls gender, age group, attendance at religious services, population density at the respondent's location (estimated from their IP address), incentive size (Hilow) and treatment order (QuizFirst). The third column includes extra demographic controls which were recorded in the second wave only: income, marital status, children, educational level, and a question on the importance of religion. Effects of nationality are robust. Few other demographic variables are significant.
Those who report attending religious services more often are more likely to report heads, and score more in the quiz, but this effect is not present within wave 2. Older people scored less in the quiz but were not less likely to report heads. The incentive size treatment had no effect. There is a small order effect in the quiz, with those who answered the quiz first scoring significantly more. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 work. Another problem is that at country level, the correlation between mean quiz score and proportion reporting heads is positive but not significant (correlation 0.247, p = 0.37), despite the significant individual-level association. This is probably due to the small number of countries.
Country correlates of honesty
The most obvious result from the coin flip is that the four least honest countries are the four Asian countries, China, India, South Korea and Japan. There are certainly theories that "Asian values" differ from non-Asian values (Zakaria, 1994; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2001 ). However, the result does not hold in the quiz, where Japan has the lowest mean score. A possible explanation is that in Japan, most gambling is illegal. Therefore, Japanese respondents may have perceived the coin flip as intrinsically unethical and been more willing to lie in this context. This suggests that the Asia-other difference is specific to the coin flip paradigm, rather than reflecting a difference in honesty in general. Paradigm-specific reactions like this confirm the importance of having multiple measures of the honesty construct: without the quiz, the data might have led to an unjustified inference. Rather than combining the measures, I report correlations with each of them separately, and place more confidence in results which are robust across the two. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63 64 65 per cent reporting heads changes sign, while that for quiz scores remains negative and weakly significant, but shrinks. Thus, honesty was related to economic growth over some period up to 1950, but this relationship has been weaker or absent over the past 60 years. Log GDP 1950 Log One story that fits this data is as follows: when institutions and technology are undeveloped, honesty is important as a substitute for formal contract enforcement. Countries that develop cultures putting a high value on honesty are able to reap economic gains. Later, this economic growth itself improves institutions and technology, making contracts easier to monitor and enforce, so that a culture of honesty is no longer necessary for further growth. However, since culture is highly persistent, the correlation between GDP and honesty remains visible in present-day behavioural data. Of course, other theories also fit the data, for example that the GDP-honesty correlation in 1950 was driven by an unobserved third variable.
One simple explanation for the result would be that respondents in poor countries face a greater temptation to lie, because they value the money reward more. Two pieces of evidence go against this. First, the 66% increase from a $3 to a $5 incentive from the LOW to the HIGH treatment did not increase lying, either in the coin flip (heads reports: 69.4% in LOW, 66.9% in HIGH) or in the quiz (mean scores: 1.39 in LOW, 1.32 in HIGH). 13 Second, respondents in wave 2 reported their monthly income, and this also did not correlate with 12 GDP data is from Gleditsch (2002 Note that at individual level, there is no evidence that religious adherence is associated with honesty. Indeed, those who claim to attend services regularly, and that religion is very important to them, report heads more often and score higher in the quiz (appendix tables 7 and 8). Thus, countries with a Protestant cultural background have higher present-day honesty, but this difference is not necessarily reflected among present-day individuals.
Result 6 At country level, honesty is not correlated with trust, and is negatively correlated with corruption but with weak significance.
I also report correlations with existing measures of trust and corruption. Johnson and Mislin (2011) 
Beliefs
Result 7 Beliefs about countries' honesty were uncorrelated with their actual honesty.
Each respondent was asked how many respondents out of 100 would report heads in the coin flip, from one target country chosen randomly from all countries in the respondent's wave. Those in the INCENT condition were offered $2 if they guessed within 10 of the true number. Target country
Guesser's country Subjects' predictions do not reflect reality. Table 3 reports regressions of predicted number of heads in a country on TargetHeads, the true percentage. Column 1 shows the bivariate correlation. It has the wrong sign.
1
Column 2 does the same for incentivized guesses only, with the same results. At individual level, less than one in four subjects guessed within 10 percentage points of the true figure, whether in incentivized or unincentivized treatments. S.e.s clustered by target country and home country. What then drives expectations? The simplest story is that subjects may predict honesty on the basis of experience in their own country. Alternatively, subjects may "project" their own preferences and behaviours on to others: if so, those reporting heads or scoring high in the quiz may expect more dishonesty from others. Relatedly, Dieckmann et al. (2015) suggest that this "social projection" is more pronounced for social groups that are similar to one's own. Lastly, subjects' level of knowledge of other countries may affect their expectations, for example via reports of dishonesty or scandals in the media.
To test these theories, I added the following variables to the belief regression: Heads, whether the subject reported heads; subject's own QuizScore; HomeHeads, the proportion reporting heads in the subject's own country; TargetIsHome, which takes the value 1 if the target country was the subject's own and 0 otherwise; and TargetDistance, the distance between subject's country and the target country in thousands of kilometers, from the CEPII dataset (variable distcap; Mayer and Zignago 2011). TargetDistance is a proxy for subjects' level of knowledge of the target country, and for their judgments of similarity with their own country. The experience theory predicts a positive coefficient for HomeHeads. The projection theory predicts a positive coefficient for
Heads and QuizScore, and possibly an interaction between Heads and TargetIsHome. Social identity theory (Tajfel et al., 1971) claims that humans attribute positive characteristics to their in-group; this would predict a negative coefficient on TargetIsHome. Broadly, if knowledge of other countries is relevant to judgments of honesty, coefficients on TargetIsHome and TargetDistance should be significant . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 Result 8 Dishonest subjects believed others would be less honest on average. Subjects in dishonest countries believed others would be more honest. Subjects expected less honesty in their own country.
Column 3 of table 3 shows the results. The Heads and QuizScore variables have the expected sign. Subjects who reported heads or scored highly in the quiz expected others to be more likely to report heads. 15 HomeHeads, however, has a significant negative sign, contradicting the experience theory: subjects from less honest countries took a more positive view of countries' honesty. TargetIsHome is positive and significant: on average, subjects expected their own countries to be less honest. Lastly, the coefficient on TargetDistance is negative but not significant. Column 4 repeats the exercise for only incentivized subjects, with essentially unchanged results. Thus, respondents showed three biases. Less honest subjects expected others to be less honest (social projection); subjects expected more honesty in other countries than their own; and subjects from more honest countries expected others to be less honest.
The positive coefficient on TargetIsHome runs counter to social identity theory. Dieckmann et al. (2015) suggest an explanation for a similar finding: subjects "socially project" their own behaviour on to fellow citizens more than on to foreigners, and since most subjects report heads, they expect others like them to do the same.
To test this, column 5 repeats the regression, adding an interaction between Heads and TargetIsHome. The interaction is not significant and is negatively signed: subjects who reported heads were not especially pessimistic about their home country. So social projection seems not to be the explanation. The last result, that subjects from more honest countries are more pessimistic, is also puzzling. It is not solely driven by beliefs about foreign countries: it holds even among subjects who guessed about their own countries (results not shown). A possible explanation for both results, which cannot be tested in this data, is media exposure: subjects might be more exposed to news stories about dishonesty in their own country than in other countries, and news stories about dishonesty may be more common or more salient in countries with high levels of honesty.
Conclusion
Comparing levels of honesty across 15 countries appears to confirm Feng Guifen's intuition: the connection between word and deed is less necessary in some places than in others. There is also some support for Feng's second claim, that this connection is good for economic development. The relationship with honesty is clearer for earlier economic growth, as summarized in 1950 GDP levels, than for growth since 1950.Finally, there is evidence of a relationship between honesty and Protestantism, as predicted by Weber's classic theory. 15 An alternative explanation is that subjects who really flipped heads naïvely expected others to do so too. But this does not explain the coefficient on QuizScore . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 In general it is an open question whether national stereotypes are accurate (Jussim et al., 2009) . In this data, beliefs about other countries' honesty had little relation to the truth, or even to the average honesty of subjects' own countries. Instead, they appear to be driven by self-projection and other cognitive biases.
The results here should be interpreted cautiously. Respondents were not a true random sample of national populations, and the two experimental measures of honesty were only weakly correlated at country level. These issues are shared with much cross-cultural experimental research. Experiments on representative samples in multiple countries are still relatively expensive and rare, and experimental economists have probably paid less attention than psychologists to questions of construct validity. To go beyond the current tentative conclusions, better sampling designs and measures will be necessary.
Nevertheless, the large cross-country differences reported here seem unlikely to be explained by sample selection alone. There is a strong case that economic development has cultural roots (Banfield, 1958; Platteau, 2000; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2006) . Experiments can help to isolate cultural differences, holding incentives and institutions constant. These results support the idea that honesty is related to economic development.
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In the next part of the survey, you will be asked to make some decisions. The decisions you make will affect the amount of money that you receive.
You do not have to fill in this part of the survey if you do not want to: in this case, simply leave responses blank. Data from this part of the survey will be stored at the University of Essex and may be released to other researchers. However, this data will not include your name or any other information that could identify you. Below is a short quiz on the topic of music. We will pay you $INCENTIVE extra if you get all the questions right. This payment will be added to your standard payment for taking the survey. Please answer the questions on your own, without looking them up elsewhere. This payment will be added to your standard payment for taking the survey.
Did the coin land on heads ? 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 Dear Professor Neilson Please find attached my final submission as requested. I made one last-minute change, adding a couple of words to the title.
With best wishes, and once again, many thanks.
David Hugh-Jones *Response to Reviewers
